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Abstract We report on a successful eradication of
methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) after an epidemic
in 1992 in the geriatric ward of a tertiary-care hospital.
After identification of MRSA in seven patients, all patients
and staff members in the geriatric ward underwent
screening. A multifaceted intervention plan was imple-
mented: contact isolation, optimization of infection control
and decolonization of all MRSA carriers. Thirty-two
patients and five staff members were found to be MRSA
carriers. Twenty one of 32 (66%) patients and all five staff
members were successfully decolonized. Seven of 32
(22%) patients died during the epidemic before decoloni-
zation. A couple was discharged with persisting MRSA
colonization and two individuals were lost to follow-up.
The eradication of the epidemic clone was proven by
systematic screenings in 1995 and 1997. Since then, the
strain has no longer been identified in our institution, based
on epidemiological surveillance and molecular typing of all
MRSA strains obtained from any specimen. This study
provides strong evidence that long-term eradication of an
MRSA epidemic in a hospital is feasible, and endemicity of
MRSA after an outbreak can be avoided. The successful
bundle approach for eradication of MRSA during an
epidemic is expensive, but the long-term benefits likely
outweigh the initial heavy use of resources.
Introduction
Since the first description of an isolate of methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) by Jevons in the
1960s [1], MRSA has emerged as the most important and
most common multiresistant pathogen worldwide [2, 3] and
has become more common than methicillin-susceptible S.
aureus in emergency rooms [4]. Although MRSA is
primarily a nosocomial pathogen, it has become endemic
in the community as well. However, MRSA prevalence is
under control in certain European countries, such as
Switzerland, [5] the Netherlands [6] and Scandinavian
countries [7]. They follow a ‘search and destroy’ strategy
[6], and antibiotic use is lower than in high-prevalence
countries [8]. This ‘search and destroy‘ policy including
several components of infection control has been largely
abandoned by most countries [9] due to lack of resources or
limited success [10]. This strategy is even more difficult to
apply in a geriatric setting because contact isolation and
strict infection control measures may lead to social
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disturbances and less contact to health-care workers [11].
Furthermore, transmission rate in this setting is low [12].
Therefore, most geriatric units restrict contact isolation to
MRSA patients with serious infections. Once being
endemic, eradication of MRSA in the affected institution
is regarded as not feasible.
Before implementation of a strict ’search and destroy‘
policy in our hospital in 1994, a MRSA epidemic in the
geriatric ward of the University Hospital Basel took place
starting in 1991. We provide strong evidence that an
epidemic clone of MRSA can be definitely eradicated even
in a geriatric ward. Only a few reports on successful
eradication of MRSA in hospitals [13, 14] or long-term
health care facilities have been published [15, 16], with
some reports showing only a partial success [17–19]. In
contrast to other reports, we have identified the MRSA
clone and we provide a longer than 10-year follow-up with
no recurrence of the epidemic clone.
Patients, materials and methods
Setting
The University Hospital Basel in Switzerland, neighboring
France and Germany, is a tertiary-care university hospital
with approximately 780 beds and 27,000 admissions yearly.
In 1991, the geriatric ward was located in a separate building
with 142 beds. The ward was divided into four floors (A–D).
Epidemiologic work-up
No formal surveillance was in place in 1991 and an
infection control committee was created shortly before the
epidemic. The epidemic was recognized after an increase in
MRSA positive samples from the geriatric ward. The
epidemiologic work-up included screening of all patients
and staff and a multifaceted intervention plan, as described
below in detail including: (i) contact isolation, (ii) routine
decolonization of all MRSA patients, (iii) staff screening
and (iv) furloughing, and decolonization of colonized
health care workers (HCWs). Screening for MRSA always
included a swab from the nares and the throat, a policy that
later proved to be useful [5, 20]. All patients were
followed-up after discharge until they became MRSA
negative, died or refused further treatment.
Screening methods and microbiology
In addition to the routine swabs from the throat and the
anterior nares, additional swabs were taken from several
sites in the epidemic situation, i.e. the groin, perianal,
rectum, urine, catheter insertion sites, and wounds. Repeat-
ed screening of MRSA was begun >48 hours after
completion of the decolonization treatment.
The swabs were cultured in a selective enrichment broth
(brain heart infusion broth). Oxacillin resistance was tested
using an oxacillin disc (National Committee for Clinical
Laboratory Standards [21]) and more recently, a cefoxitin
disc. In case of equivocal results, detection of aurease,
penicillin-binding protein 2a, and PCR for mecA gene and
femA gene were performed. All MRSA strains isolated
since the epidemic in 1992 underwent typing by pulsed-
field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) [22]. Additionally, more
than 90% of all subsequent strains underwent PCR-based
[23] or spa-[22] typing. DNA sequences of spa-typing were
analyzed by using Ridom StaphType software (Ridom
GmbH, Wuerzburg, Germany) and synchronized using
SpaServer (www.spaserver.ridom.de) [22]. PCR was used
to detect selected virulence-associated genes [22].
Intervention
Infection control policies were enforced with a focus on
teaching of correct hand hygiene with an alcoholic hand rub
[24]. A dispenser for alcoholic hand rub was installed in front
of every patient room and at the bedside of every patient.
MRSA patients were put in contact isolation or were cohorted.
Strict, monitored barrier precautions were implemented if
working with MRSA patients, i.e. gloves, masks and gowns.
All textiles with patient contact were changed daily and
washed at a minimum temperature of 90°C. Chlorhexidine-
alcohol replaced polyvinylpyrrolidone (PVP)-iodine for skin
disinfection for its residual effect. A head nurse for the
isolation ward was designated to enforce the new regulations.
All HCWs from the isolation ward received additional training
in infection control practices and weekly meetings allowed for
exchange of information on microbiology results.
MRSA colonized HCWs were furloughed until having
had a repeated negative screening for MRSA. All MRSA
patients were transferred to one single isolation floor of the
geriatric hospital: floor C on the upper level with 26 beds in
11 rooms. All other floors underwent terminal disinfection
with 2% glutaraldehyde. The patients were classified in
three different risk groups:
• Group A, high risk
Patients with MRSA colonization of wounds or
respiratory tract infections were not allowed to leave
their rooms. Full barrier precautions (gloves, gown and
mask) were mandatory when entering a patients’ room.
• Group B, low risk
MRSA patients not meeting criteria for group A
were allowed to leave their rooms for meals, and to
socialize with other MRSA colonized patients. Full
barrier precautions were mandatory when in contact
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with colonized sites. Gloves were indicated whenever
patient contact was anticipated.
• Group C, transition group
Group C consisted of former group A or B patients,
in whom three consecutive screenings of all body sites
were negative after a completed decolonization scheme.
These patients were transferred to the ’MRSA-free’ or
‘clean’ part of the isolation ward, which was separated
from the ’contaminated‘ part. This group was separated
from the two former groups, and from non-colonized
patients on the other floors. After two weeks, they were
transferred to a ‘clean’ floor of the ward, if repeated
cultures for MRSA once weekly remained negative.
Decolonization
All colonized patients and HCWs underwent decoloniza-
tion using a draft version of a standardized decolonization
treatment outlined in Table 1 [25]. Additionally, tooth-
brushes were disinfected daily in chlorhexidine 2%. The
skin was treated by bathing twice weekly and daily
application of chlorhexidine soap (Hibiscrub®). Chlorhex-
idine baths were continued every other week in non-
MRSA carriers. In addition, patients with urinary tract
colonization were treated systemically, e.g. using trimeth-
oprim/sulfamethoxazole.
Results
Outbreak investigation
The first isolate of the epidemic was identified from a blood
culture in May 1991 (patient 1). It took 18 months, until a
second case (patient 2), hospitalized on the same ward
(floor A) was identified in November 1992. Despite an
Fig. 1 Incidence of MRSA cases and relapses
Table 1 Scheme for decolonization
Site of colonization First choice Application
Skin Soap containing 4% chlorhexidine With every shower or bath
Hands Alcoholic hand rub Disinfection after nose cleaning and use of the rest rooms, before
preparation of meals and contact to other individuals
Nose Mupirocin ointment (alternative:
fusidic acid)
Applied twice daily in both nares
Throat Spray containing chlorhexidine 0.2%
(alternative: PVP-iodine)
Five sprays after every meal
Chlorhexidine mouth rinse 0.2%
(alternative: PVP-iodine)
Gargle with 20 ml after every meal
Gastrointestinal
(positive rectal swab)
Vancomycin solution (alternative:
teicoplanin)
Vancomycin 0.5 g diluted in 10 ml of water or coffee twice a day
Perineal Mupirocin ointment (alternative: PVP-
iodine or bacitracinum)
Application using a swab after each defecation
PVP-iodine polyvinylpyrrolidone-iodine
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immediate isolation of the patient and screening of the
roommate, two other patients (patients 3+4) were identified
on floor D. One of these patients was a former roommate of
patient 2. Patient 5 on floor C and patient 6 on floor B
followed. At that time, at least one MRSA carrier per floor
was identified. In December 1992, PFGE confirmed an
ongoing outbreak. In January 1993, all patients and staff
members in the geriatric ward were screened for MRSA.
The epidemic strain was identified in 16 additional patients.
Furthermore, a total of three HCWs and two housekeeping
personnel were detected as MRSA carriers.
The MRSA strain was resistant against aminoglycosides
and quinolones, but susceptible for trimethoprim/sulfame-
thoxazole, doxycycline and fusidic acid. Molecular typing
identified this type as PFGE type 1 and Spa-typing type
t001. This Spa-type may be related to MLST type ST-5, ST-
222 or ST-228, all belonging to CC5, and is known as
Southern German MRSA, Rhine Hesse MRSA, EMRSA-3,
and New York clone (http://spaserver2.ridom.de/mlst.shtml)
[26]. Genes for Panton-Valentine leukocidin, toxic-shock
syndrome toxin, exfoliative toxin A, B and D and
staphylococcal enterotoxins A–E were not detected by PCR.
Control of the epidemic
In January 1993, the bundle of measures described above
was strictly implemented. Nevertheless, four additional
patients became MRSA carriers in the first month of the
intervention, and many relapses in intermittently decolon-
ized patients occurred (Fig. 1). The last patient newly
diagnosed as a carrier of the epidemic MRSA strain was
identified in November 1994.
The sites of colonization in the patients are summarized
in Table 2. Of interest, urine was the second most common
site of colonization (56%), possibly due to the high
prevalence of urinary incontinence (56%) and urinary
catheters in this population (78%).
Outcome
Overall, the epidemic strain was identified in 32 patients,
three HCWs and two housekeeping personnel between May
18, 1991 and May 29, 1995. The attack rate was 12.3%
during the peak of the epidemic.
Decolonization was successful in 21/32 (66%) patients
and 5/5 (100%) staff members (three HCWs and two
housekeeping personal). Before having had three sets of
negative MRSA cultures, 7/32 (22%) patients died. A
couple was discharged as persistent MRSA carriers refusing
any further therapy and two (6%) patients were lost to
follow-up. In the 2.5 years following the epidemic, i.e.
1993–1995, 20 reoccurrences were diagnosed in 14
patients. The mean duration of MRSA colonization was Ta
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124.9 days (range 99.9–149.9). A mean of 1.6 (range 1–4)
cycles of decolonization were performed until achievement
of permanent MRSA negativity (Fig. 2).
During the two-year epidemic, an 18.3% increase in
patient-days was observed. The additional costs for pro-
longed hospitalization of patients and the control measures
were estimated to cost $195,000 and $290,000, respectively.
Follow-up
The epidemic MRSA strain was announced to be eradicated
on May 29, 1995. All patients and staff of the geriatric ward
were again screened in the nares and throat in August 1995
and June 1997. Not one single MRSA carrier was
identified. Up to now, this MRSA type has no longer been
observed, even when a representative strain of the outbreak
was analyzed using additional molecular methods such as
PCR [23] or spa typing [22].
Discussion
This is the first report of a successful eradication of an
MRSA epidemic from a geriatric institution with long-term
epidemiologic and molecular follow-up. Thirty-two patients
and five staff members acquired the identical epidemic
strain of MRSA, which was never again identified after
cessation of the epidemic with a follow-up of longer than
10 years. The bundle approach led to the complete
eradication of this epidemic strain from the hospital.
Not previously identified as a MRSA carrier, the index
patient was transferred from a nursing home. He suffered
from a serious form of an attention deficit hyperactivity
syndrome and was walking around in the geriatric ward,
which probably facilitated initial spread. Nevertheless, it
took 18 months until an outbreak was recognized, likely
explained by lack of surveillance and of an infection control
team.
There are various guidelines describing how to control
or prevent the epidemic spread of MRSA [27, 28], but few
recommendations on how to eradicate MRSA from an
institution in case of an epidemic. Once endemic, strains
over time may vary, but MRSA eradication is considered as
not feasible. Finnish authors reported eradication of an
epidemic MRSA clone after outbreaks at the University
Hospital of Turku [13] and in Helsinki [14] using a similar
approach: screening of all patients and staff members,
cohorting and strict isolation of all MRSA patients,
Ward Number
Date of initial 
MRSA diagnosis
A 1 18/05/1991 ?
A 2 16/11/1992
A 3 28/11/1992
A 4 15/12/1992
C 5 18/12/1992
B 6 21/12/1992
B 7 29/12/1992
C 8 04/01/1993
B 9 04/01/1993
A 10 06/01/1993
A 11 06/01/1993
A 12 06/01/1993
B HCW 1 06/01/1993
B 13 07/01/1993
B 14 07/01/1993
B 15 07/01/1993
B 16 07/01/1993
B 17 07/01/1993
B 18 07/01/1993
B HCW 2 07/01/1993
B HCW 3 07/01/1993
B 19 07/01/1993
B HCW 4 07/01/1993
C 20 11/01/1993
C 21 11/01/1993
C 22 11/01/1993
B HCW 5 11/01/1993
B 23 12/01/1993
B 24 01/02/1993
B 25 01/02/1993 ?
B 26 01/02/1993
27 01/02/1993
28 18/11/1993
29 29/11/1993
30 27/04/1994
31 15/08/1994
32 25/11/1994
Mar
1991
AprDec JanNov
1992
Feb Mar
1993
JunMay Jun Jul Apr MayAug Sep Aug
1995
JulOct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Sep MayDec
1994
AprJan Feb MarOct Nov
Fig. 2 Time line of MRSA colonization. † death, ? lost to follow-up, HCW health care worker
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decolonization of all MRSA carriers and finally, teaching of
an optimized hand disinfection. However, molecular typing
was not completed, and the studies had a short period of
follow-up. In addition, they did not actively screen the
whole patient population after cessation of the outbreak and
they did not perform additional throat screening, reducing
the sensitivity of the screening [5, 20]. All subsequent
MRSA isolates from all clinics within the University
Hospital Basel were molecularly characterized. To date,
there is no evidence by epidemiological or molecular
methods that this clone reoccurred in the University
Hospital Basel, including in the geriatric ward which was
moved in 2003 to another building. As geriatric hospitals
and nursing homes send their samples to the university
laboratory, the follow-up was as complete as possible. In
contrast to the intervention in Turku, which involved other
institutions in the surroundings as well, the epidemic in our
hospital was controlled by an intervention limited to our
hospital. As this approach was successful, we presume that
the spread of MRSA in the community is negligible.
Because inter-hospital spread of epidemic and endem-
ic MRSA strains are well known [29], the eradication of
the MRSA epidemic was crucial to continuously control
the MRSA prevalence in our low-endemic region. In
contrast, an eradication of MRSA from hospitals in
highly endemic countries seems impossible. We conclude
that for future epidemics of resistant pathogens, e.g.
vancomycin-nonsusceptible S. aureus, an early control
using a ‘search and destroy’ strategy may be successful
and that in the case of an epidemic, the measures
presented in this report may eradicate the pathogen from
the hospital before an endemic situation takes place.
However, without the available rooms to isolate carriers,
the budget—in our case a budget increase of almost
$400,000—and the needed manpower, an eradication of
MRSA would be difficult.
There are a few limitations to this report. Due to the
long follow-up, part of the data was not available. The
death of seven patients may have biased the results towards
success. The outbreak was caused by a strain exhibiting
phenotypic and molecular traits of a ‘classical’ hospital-
onset MRSA strain. It remains to be demonstrated that
eradication of a community-onset MRSA strain will be
successful as well.
However, our report has several strengths. The long
follow-up of more than 10 years and continued typing of all
MRSA isolates prove that the epidemic strain was
definitely eradicated and that there is no evidence that the
strain responsible for the outbreak was replaced by another
epidemic strain. Not one single case of MRSA colonization
was detected in two full-house screenings of all patients and
staff members in the geriatric ward after cessation of the
epidemic and in routine post-discharge screenings of
patients including home visits. Furthermore, we performed
throat swabs in all patients which significantly increase the
sensitivity of screening [5, 20].
Worldwide, the epidemic clone represents about 1.45%
of all S. aureus strains; in the years 2009 and 2010, it was
found most often in Germany, but also in other countries
including Austria and Switzerland (http://spaserver2.ridom.
de/spa-t001.shtml). However, in our hospital we found only
three single patient isolates of this strain among 200 MRSA
strains identified after the epidemic [22].
In conclusion, we show that in a low endemic region for
MRSA, eradication of an MRSA epidemic in a hospital is
feasible. Our experience may help to control epidemics due
to other emerging pathogens, i.e. vancomycin-nonsusceptible
S. aureus, and prevent these pathogens from becoming
endemic in institutions.
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